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A B S T R A C T
The UK has ambitious, statutory long-term climate targets that will require deep decarbonisation of its energy
system. One key question facing policymakers is the role of natural gas both during the transition towards, and in
the achievement of, a future low-carbon energy system. Here we assess a range of possible futures for the UK,
and ﬁnd that gas is unlikely to act as a cost-eﬀective ‘bridge’ to a decarbonised UK energy system. There is also
limited scope for gas in power generation after 2030 if the UK is to meet its emission reduction targets, in the
absence of carbon capture and storage (CCS). Without CCS, a ‘second dash for gas’ while providing short-term
gains in reducing emissions, is unlikely to be the most cost-eﬀective way to reduce emissions, and could result in
stranded assets and compromise the UK's decarbonisation ambitions. In such a case, gas use in 2050 is estimated
at only 10% of its 2010 level. However, with signiﬁcant CCS deployment by 2050, natural gas could remain at
50–60% of the 2010 level, primarily in the industrial (including hydrogen production) and power generation
sectors.
1. Introduction
Natural gas has the lowest combustion carbon intensity of the three
major fossil fuels (see e.g. IPCC, 2006). However, it has been shown
that increases in the consumption of natural gas are not suﬃcient for
reducing global greenhouse gas emissions since this would potentially
substitute for both higher-carbon fossil fuels, e.g. coal or oil, as well as
for lower-carbon or zero-carbon energy sources, such as renewables
(McJeon et al., 2014). McGlade et al. (2014) and McGlade and Ekins
(2015) examined possible futures for fossil fuels, with a particular focus
on the ‘bridging’ role that natural gas may be able to play during a
transition to a global low-carbon energy system. This research found
that there is a good potential for gas to act as a transition fuel to a low-
carbon future up to 2035 on a global level under certain conditions.
However, a key caveat to the positive conclusion that natural gas
can play a ‘bridging’ role globally is that its potential varies sig-
niﬁcantly between diﬀerent regions. While some national-level studies
have demonstrated that increases in natural gas consumption, in com-
bination with certain emissions-reduction policies, can help reduce
overall greenhouse gas emissions in the United States (Brandt et al.,
2014; Moniz et al., 2010), it does not follow that this is the case in all
countries and regions around the world. It is also noteworthy that the
International Energy Agency's ‘Golden Age of Gas’ scenario that ex-
plored a future with more natural gas in the global energy system re-
sulted in projected emissions on a trajectory consistent with a tem-
perature rise of 3.7 °C (IEA, 2011), well above the internationally-
agreed threshold of “well-below 2 °C” (United Nations, 2015).
One crucial factor aﬀecting the decarbonisation potential of natural
gas is the level of fugitive methane emissions that occur during its
production, transportation and distribution. This has been an ongoing
source of controversy since the ﬁrst paper on the subject by Howarth
et al. (2011) suggested that such emissions from shale gas extraction
were so high that they counteracted all beneﬁts of switching from coal
to gas, although multiple papers subsequently contested these ﬁndings
(Lawrence et al., 2011; Levi, 2013; O'Sullivan and Paltsev, 2012).
Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that the UK's long-term dec-
arbonisation objectives (see Section 2.2 below) include only ‘territorial
emissions’, or emissions generated within the country. Any fugitive
methane from natural gas produced by the UK is included within its
territorial emissions but imported gas is eﬀectively ‘carbon-neutral’
from an upstream emissions perspective (the UK imported 45% of its
gas in 2014). An increase in domestic gas production, such as from its
putative shale gas resource (Andrews, 2013) might have lower life-
cycle emissions than other sources of imports, such as Liqueﬁed Natural
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Gas (LNG) (MacKay and Stone, 2013). However, any fugitive emissions
from domestic production would augment the UK's territorial emis-
sions, potentially making it harder to achieve the UK's domestic dec-
arbonisation objectives.
In the UK, natural gas accounted for 34% of total primary energy
consumption in 2015: of that 30% was used in the generation of elec-
tricity and heat by power stations, 37% by households, mainly in
heating buildings, and the remainder by industry and other users (BEIS,
2016). Climate change policies are a key dynamic that will aﬀect future
levels of gas consumption but Bradshaw et al. (2014) also highlighted
the myriad of technological, economic, and policy factors that will af-
fect gas consumption in the UK. The range of uncertainties around these
factors means that how large natural gas consumption might be and
what role it might play in the future, in the UK and elsewhere, depends
on the assumptions about these factors and therefore remains an open
question. This is illustrated in the UK context by the recent Future
Energy Scenarios, developed by the national gas system operator
(National Grid, 2016). They imply a lower consumption by 2030 under
all cases, even those that do not meet the UK climate ambition, with a
stronger reduction under the “Gone Green” scenario of around 25%.
However, they also point to substantial quantities of gas still being
required in the 2030s.
Here we use the energy system models UKTM (Daly et al., 2015)
and ESME (Heaton, 2014; Pye et al., 2015b) to examine changes in the
role of gas in the UK under a range of future energy scenarios. We use
two alternative models here for diﬀerent reasons. First, the two models
are better suited to constructing diﬀerent types of scenarios. ESME
allows for the exploration of a large number of simulations, under a
wide set of parametric uncertainties. This allows for a better assess-
ment of the range of possible pathways, and a more systematic as-
sessment of under what conditions diﬀerent pathways emerge for
natural gas. UKTM is a more complex model, with a more detailed
representation of the energy system, but which is unable to run a very
large number of simulations. UKTM includes a resource-upstream
sector, with a more detailed characterisation of domestic gas produc-
tion, processing and distribution, and imports. It also captures the
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions across the energy system, important
given the potential for methane emissions associated with gas pro-
duction and distribution. Finally, end use sectors which use gas, the
carbon capture and storage (CCS) system, and hydrogen production all
have enhanced detail compared to ESME. Second, the set-up and as-
sumptions within these models vary and so we avoid drawing ﬁrm
conclusions based only on a single model.
In discussing the central question of this paper, whether or not gas
can act as a ‘bridge’ fuel, there are two conditions that we consider need
to be fulﬁlled. In a scenario that is consistent with maximum 2 °C
temperature average global warming, gas consumption should increase
either absolutely from 2010 or relative to another scenario that does
not meet this temperature constraint. More speciﬁcally:
• Natural gas acts a ‘relative’ bridge in a region (or globally) when
total consumption is greater in some period in a scenario consistent
with at 2 °C temperature rise, relative to a scenario that contains no
GHG emissions reduction policies.
• Natural gas acts as an ‘absolute’ bridge in a region (or globally)
when total consumption rises above current levels over some period
until it reaches a peak and subsequently enters a permanent or
terminal decline.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 de-
scribes the modelling approach and the scenario framing; Section 3
follows with a presentation of the results from both models; and
Section 4 develops the discussion around the modelling insights, be-
fore drawing some key conclusions around the future role of gas in the
UK.
2. Modelling approach and scenarios constructed
This section gives a brief overview of the two energy system models
that have been used for the analysis—UKTM and ESME—and the sce-
narios that will be implemented with each. These models have some
features in common—within physical and technical constraints, they
optimise energy system development over time (minimising energy
system cost or maximising a measure of social welfare) by assuming
rational decision making by a central policy planner who has perfect
information about the future. While the model frameworks necessarily
provide a proxy representation of the actual energy system and its
evolution, they nevertheless provide important insights about how
energy systems could change in response to drivers, such as fuel prices
and emissions limits, and some of the trade-oﬀs and choices that could
be important. A detailed description of the two models used in this
paper is provided in Appendix A.
2.1. Energy system models
ESME (Energy Systems Modelling Environment), developed by the
Energy Technologies Institute (ETI), is a fully integrated energy systems
model, used to determine the role of diﬀerent low carbon technologies
required to achieve the UK's mitigation targets. The model has been
used in this capacity by the former UK Department for Energy and
Climate Change (DECC), now known as the Department for Business,
Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), and the UK Committee on
Climate Change (CCC, 2013, 2010; DECC, 2011a). The model uses
linear programming to assess cost-optimal technology portfolios. Un-
certainty around cost and performance of diﬀerent technologies and
resource prices is captured via a probabilistic approach, using Monte
Carlo sampling techniques. Gas extraction, production and distribution,
and the associated emissions from this sector, are not represented ex-
plicitly, nor is there a distinction between domestic and imported gas
resources. The limited representation of domestic gas production and
distribution, and associated CH4 emissions, means, for example, that
any potential methane emissions penalty that would be incurred under
stringent climate policy is not taken into account.
The UK TIMES energy system model (UKTM) is based on the model
generator TIMES (The Integrated MARKAL-EFOM System), which is
developed and maintained by the Energy Technology Systems Analysis
Programme (ETSAP) of the International Energy Agency (IEA) (Loulou
and Labriet, 2007). UKTM is a technology-oriented, dynamic, linear
programming optimisation model representing the entire UK energy
system (as one region) from imports and domestic production of fuel
resources, through fuel processing and supply, explicit representation of
infrastructures, conversion to secondary energy carriers (including
electricity, heat and hydrogen), end use technologies and energy ser-
vice demands. It minimises total welfare costs under perfect foresight to
meet the exogenously given sectoral energy demands and thereby de-
livers an economy-wide solution of cost-optimal energy market devel-
opment. Distinctive from the ESME model, all GHGs associated with the
energy system are accounted, including CH4 emissions from domestic
production and distribution of natural gas. For gas and other energy
commodity imports, only emissions at the point of use are accounted, as
per the territorial or production basis for inventory accounting.
2.2. Scenarios constructed
ESME is well suited to exploring the eﬀects of uncertainty on future
energy and emissions pathways. We therefore use this strength here to
explore the eﬀects of uncertainty in technology investment costs in the
power and transport sectors, fuel costs and resource potential (e.g.
biomass imports), on future levels of gas consumption in the UK under
diﬀerent emissions assumptions. In the context of these uncertainties,
recognising that there are others we have not included, we explore
three speciﬁc scenarios that have been shown previously to have a large
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eﬀect on the levels of gas consumed. These three scenarios are:
(i) A reference case which is required to meet the 4th Carbon Budget
(a 50% reduction on 1990 emission levels by 2025) but with no
other explicit requirements to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) or
CO2 emissions thereafter;
(ii) An 80% GHG emissions reduction by 2050 case in which CCS is
permitted; and
(iii) An 80% GHG emissions reduction by 2050 case in which CCS is not
permitted.
A detailed description of the uncertainties explored is provided in
Pye et al. (2015b) and summarised in Table 1 below. A Monte-Carlo
simulation process is used to explore these uncertainties with 250 runs
implemented for each of the above three scenarios.
The more detailed representation of the UK energy system in UKTM
means that there is a consequent trade-oﬀ with the time to run a spe-
ciﬁc scenario. As a result, we use it here to explore ﬁve better-deﬁned
but discrete scenarios. These scenarios are described in Appendix B,
with some of the key assumptions that vary across each of the above
scenarios are set out in Table 2.
The ﬁrst, called ‘Abandon’ assumes that climate change policy is
downgraded in importance during the late 2010s, meaning that limits
on emissions beyond the 3rd Carbon Budget (2018-22) are not im-
plemented. Because of a relative lack of emphasis internationally on
moving away from fossil fuels, and consequently higher overall de-
mand, thus the price of fossil fuels is relatively high in this scenario. The
second, Insular, scenario also assumes that climate change policy is
downgraded in importance during the late 2010s. Following the recent
decision to leave the European Union, this scenario models a shifts
towards a more inward looking energy policy with, for example, much
less electricity connection to the European continent. Strict limits are
placed on imports in favour of domestic fossil fuel (including new coal
and shale gas) and renewable resources, and prices of fossil fuels are
relatively high as a result.
The Aﬀordable scenario continues with commitment to climate
change targets well into the 2020s. However, the world does not act
suﬃciently quickly to reduce emissions, and so the UK commitment to
emissions reduction starts to falter. Policies to support the deployment
of renewables are progressively scaled back as is policy support for
nuclear and CCS. In the Maintain scenario, the UK continues its com-
mitment to the long-term climate change targets (i.e. 80% GHG emis-
sions reduction by 2050). This drives down the costs of many low-
carbon technologies and energy eﬃciency measures, including CCS
which is successfully commercialised and ‘rolled out’ (after 2025)
alongside other low carbon technologies. Since the world shifts away
from carbon-intensive fuels, fossil fuel prices remain relatively low.
TheMaintain (tech fail) scenario is similar to Maintain, but there is
a failure of eﬀorts to commercialise CCS technologies. More emphasis is
therefore placed on other forms of mitigation to meet UK targets such as
renewables, nuclear power and energy eﬃciency.
These latter two scenarios are additionally required to keep within a
cumulative level of emissions between 2028 (the end of the “4th Carbon
Budget” period) and 2050. This ensures that there is a steady progres-
sion towards the 2050 target and is used as a proxy for future Carbon
Budgets to be set by the Committee on Climate Change. Since the
analysis undertaken in this paper, the proposed level of the 5th Carbon
Budget, for the period 2028–2032 has been agreed, setting reductions
(including international shipping) at 57% below 1990 levels (CCC,
2015). Both of these scenarios see reductions in this budget period at
levels slightly lower than set out in the 5th Carbon Budget.
Table 1
Areas of uncertainty explored in ESME runs.
Parameter Sector Approximate range of uncertainty
Investment
costs
Power
generation
Increases with novelty of technology from±20% for mature technologies to± 70% central estimate for novel technologies
Road transport Increases with novelty of technology from±10% for mature technologies to between +60% and −20% central estimate for novel technologies
Heat pumps &
district heating
± 30% central estimate
Annual
build
rates
Power
generation
± 50% central estimate
Resources Biomass
availability
+150% & −50% central estimate
Prices Around±40% central estimate for gas and coal
Around +150% and −50% central estimate for oil
Table 2
Core assumptions varied across the UKTM scenarios. Under required emissions reduction, ‘Carbon Budgets’ refer to the 5 year periods across which average emission reductions have to be
achieved, and which get progressively more ambitious over time to ensure the UK is on track to meet the long term 2050 reduction ambition. The latest agreed 5th Carbon Budget period
will run between 2028–2032, and is near achieved in both Maintain scenarios.
Scenario Name Required GHG emissions reduction Technology availability Fossil fuel
prices
Import dependency
Abandon 35% reduction by 2020 (meets 3rd Carbon Budget
only)
No new coal High Outcome of the model
Nuclear delay
Insular 35% reduction by 2020 (meets 3rd Carbon Budget
only)
Max interconnector 4 GW High Max 30% primary energy in 2020, falling to
5% by 2030
Aﬀordable 50% reduction by 2025 Slow renewables deployment Low Outcome of the model
(meets 4th Carbon Budget only) Delay in new nuclear
60% reduction by 2050 Delay in CCS
Maintain 80% reduction by 2050 (meet all legislated Carbon
Budgets, and 2050 target)
No new coal Central Outcome of the model
Maintain (tech failure) 80% reduction by 2050 (meet all legislated Carbon
Budgets, and 2050 target)
No new coal Central Outcome of the model
No CCS
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3. Results
3.1. ESME results
Gas consumption in the three core ESME scenarios is presented in
Fig. 1 which shows the implications of the uncertainties set out in
Table 1. The maximum and minimum of these uncertainty ranges de-
scribe the 10th to 90th percentiles of consumption from the 250 runs in
each time period i.e. the bottom of the range is deﬁned by consumption
in the 25th lowest run and the top by consumption in the 225th lowest
(or 25th highest) run.
Median gas consumption in the reference case (that meets the 4th
Carbon Budget) initially falls out to 2020 before rising rapidly between
2030 and 2040 and ﬁnishing at 4250 PJ (115 Bcm), a 10% increase on
2010 levels. The uncertainty spread also grows over time from around
25% of the median value1 in 2030 to over 60% by 2050.
Fig. 2 (left panel) gives the relationship between gas consumption in
the Reference scenario and gas prices in 2050: consumption does not
increase much above 4900 PJ (130 Bcm) regardless of the assumed gas
price level. This ‘saturation level’ occurs because most (> 90%) of
electricity generation is met by gas, which also provides 65% of
household fuel (this could be 5–10% higher if there was no penetration
of district heating), and all Heavy Goods Vehicles (HGVs) are converted
to run on natural gas. As a result, there is little additional market share
that gas can gain.
In the 80% reduction case with CCS, the median consumption
initially falls but is then largely ﬂat to 2040 at just over 3100 PJ
(around 85 Bcm) before exhibiting a large drop in the ﬁnal period and
thus ending up 40% below 2010 levels. The uncertainty spread up to
2030 is similar to that in the reference case but thereafter it grows
rapidly to over 100% by 2050. This rapid growth in uncertainty occurs
because of the larger range of new technology options that are available
to the model in latter periods (such as conversion to hydrogen, use with
CCS in the power sector), but the wide spread in the costs and rates at
which these can be built. The changing manner in which gas is used out
to 2050 is explored in more detail in the discrete UKTM scenarios
below.
Comparing the median of the two scenarios it is again apparent that
after 2020, consumption is always lower in the 80% reduction case than
in the reference case. Despite the small rise over 2030–2040 in the
“with-CCS” scenario (a period in which CCS can start to be deployed at
scale), the predominant downward trend of the median throughout the
modelling period suggests that the ESME model ﬁnds little potential for
gas to act as a bridge in the UK in an optimal trajectory towards a low-
carbon energy system.
Nevertheless, it can also be seen that there is signiﬁcant overlap
between the uncertainty distributions for these two scenarios.
Consumption in some of pathways towards the upper end of the dis-
tribution in the 80% reduction case with CCS is not signiﬁcantly lower
than 2010 levels. In general, these occur whenever gas prices are low
and the technology options (e.g. hydrogen production or industrial use
with CCS) that can utilise gas as an input have favourable cost and build
rate assumptions. Fig. 2 (right panel) indicates that future gas levels in
the 80% reduction case are closely (albeit not perfectly) correlated to
assumed gas prices. If gas prices remain low (below around 60p/therm
Fig. 1. UK gas consumption in the three core
ESME scenarios. Top left: Reference case where
only the climate ambition set out in the 4th Carbon
Budget (2023–2027) is met. Top right: 80% reduc-
tion case meeting the UK legislated Carbon Budgets
and 2050 target with CCS technologies available for
deployment. Bottom: 80% reduction case but
without CCS deployment. In all plots, the number of
simulations run is 250. The light shaded areas re-
present the 10th to 90th percentile ranges, dark
shaded areas the 33rd to 66th percentile ranges, and
solid lines the medians. The left hand axis has units
in PJ, and the right hand axis in Bcm.
1 This is calculated by taking the diﬀerence between the high and low values and di-
viding by the median.
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out to 2050), and there is suﬃcient technological innovation, including
implementation of CCS, it could be possible for gas consumption in
2050 to be at similar levels to those in 2010 whilst still meeting the UK's
emission reduction goals.
Finally, gas consumption for the 80% reduction case without CCS
exhibits a sharp decline over the modelling period, and reaches less
than 500 PJ (15 Bcm) by 2050. There is also almost no uncertainty
spread despite utilising the same range of uncertainties that were ex-
plored in the previous two scenarios. This demonstrates that if CCS is
not available, these uncertainties have next to no eﬀect on the level of
gas consumption. Reaching the UK's emission reduction goals without
CCS requires that, despite uncertainty over resource prices, power and
end-use sector build rates and investment costs, gas must be steadily
phased out over the next 35 years and thus be almost entirely removed
from the UK energy system by 2050.
This is not only because gas cannot itself be used with CCS in this
scenario, which clearly restricts its use when CO2 emissions reductions
are required, but also because decarbonisation of all secondary and
end-use sectors is much harder to achieve without the use of CCS.
Sectors that may continue to rely upon unabated gas consumption in
the 80% reduction case with CCS therefore have to work additionally
hard to reduce emissions. Gas is no longer useful as these sectors must
shift to other low or zero carbon sources.
3.2. UKTM results
The detail of the diﬀerences in the use of gas over time and between
scenarios can be best examined using the discrete runs implemented in
UKTM. In this section we focus initially on the three scenarios that miss
the long-term 80% reduction goal (Section 3.2.1), next turning to
those that meet this goal (Section 3.2.2), and then ﬁnally comparing
these to examine the extent to which gas can act as a bridging fuel
(Section 3.2.3). A summary of key results and observations is provided
at the end of the section, in Table 3.
3.2.1. Scenarios that miss emissions reduction goals
Figs. 3 and 4 present the changes in primary energy consumption
and sectoral changes in gas consumption in the Abandon, Insular, and
Aﬀordable scenarios: those that are not required to reduce emissions
by 80% by 2050. Primary energy consumption in all scenarios in 2030
is at least 22% lower than in 2010, although it then stays relatively
constant in each scenario thereafter.
Abandon exhibits the smallest drop to 2030 in overall primary
energy consumption, much of which is due to a reduction in coal
consumption. Abandon also has the smallest change in the level of gas
consumption and in the way it is consumed. Despite dropping by nearly
20% between 2010 and 2015, gas consumption after 2015 remains
broadly constant. There is a reduction in use in centralised gas gen-
eration over time, but this loss is compensated for by an increase in the
use of combined heat and power (CHP) units in both the residential and
industrial sectors. As a result, gas use in the residential sector actually
increases steadily from 2015 onwards, the only scenario in which this
occurs.
In 2030, primary energy consumption in Aﬀordable is relatively
similar to that in Abandon with slightly less coal consumption and
higher levels of renewables and nuclear, but these diﬀerences are small.
Both cases exhibit a strong move towards imported gas in the 2030s,
but with a larger use of domestically-produced gas in the longer term,
due to some exploitation of shale (as the level of import gas prices make
this resource more viable). The largest diﬀerence is in gas consumption,
which exhibits a steadier decrease over time despite the availability of
cheap gas. As the need for a 60% reduction in emissions by 2050 is most
Fig. 2. Relationship between consumption and
gas prices in 2050 in the reference (left) and 80%
reduction with CCS cases (right). These ﬁgures
include all 250 projections, with a linear line of best
ﬁt (pink line) plotted for the 80% reduction case
(right panel). The vertical dashed blue line indicates
the gas consumption level in 2010. (For interpreta-
tion of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend,
the reader is referred to the web version of this ar-
ticle.)
Table 3
Summary of scenario results.
Scenario Name GHG emission reductions (rel.
to 1990)
Gas consumption level, PJ (%
relative to 2010)
Key observations
2030 2050 2030 2050
Abandon −35% −33% 3407 (88%) 3223 (83%) Limited reductions due to lack of either climate or security concerns. No
increases due to higher gas price assumptions.
Insular −46% −43% 1924 (50%) 1900 (49%) Rapid reduction in gas use by 2030 driven by energy security concerns, with a
strong shift towards domestic gas, including shale in the longer term.
Aﬀordable −50% −60% 2920 (75%) 2442 (63%) Stronger reductions than abandon due to higher climate ambition. Post 2030,
more limited decline as climate ambition fails to strengthen.
Maintain −53% −80% 2579 (67%) 1779 (46%) Strong reductions by 2030 driven by climate ambition. These continue to
2050 although considerable gas remains in system due to CCS.
Maintain (tech
failure)
−53% −80% 2262 (58%) 439 (11%) Large reductions by 2050 in the absence of CCS, and under stringent climate
policy.
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cost-eﬀectively met by the decarbonisation of electricity, existing gas
generation capacity is retired and is not replaced. Consequently, be-
tween 2030 and 2050 gas use in centralised generation exhibits the
largest drop seen in any sector. In the residential sector there is a 1%/
year average decline in gas use made possible initially through eﬃ-
ciency measures and latterly by a small degree of electriﬁcation of heat.
Insular displays the largest changes of the three scenarios in both
2030 and 2050. Given the need to rely predominantly on domestic
sources of energy production, there is a much greater (and rapid) up-
take in eﬃciency measures. Primary energy consumption is therefore
15% lower than in Abandon in 2030. Coal consumption is also sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent, and this is the only scenario in which coal main-
tains its current share of primary energy consumption of around 15%
throughout the model horizon; in all other scenarios, coal drops to less
than 5% by 2030. Between 2010 and 2030 gas use falls by 50%, with
gas entirely removed from the electricity sector, and residential sector
consumption dropping by nearly 30%. After 2030, annual consumption
stagnates at around 2000 PJ (55 Bcm) with all sectors continuing to
maintain their levels of consumption. A small level of exports can be
observed in 2050, as shale production increases.
3.2.2. Focus on 80% reduction targets
Figs. 5 and 6 display primary energy consumption and sectoral gas
consumption in the two core scenarios that meet the UK's long-term
emission reduction targets. Over the medium-term diﬀerences in energy
consumption between these two scenarios and between the scenarios
described above do not appear too large. For example, primary energy
consumption in 2030 in both scenarios is 27% below 2010 levels,
Fig. 3. Primary energy consumption (PJ) in UKTM scenarios failing to meet 2050
carbon targets. Scenarios not meeting 2050 targets include Abandon, Insular, and
Aﬀordable. Natural gas is split into domestic production (Dom) and net imports (Imp).
Note that there are gas exports in Insular in 2050.
Fig. 4. Sectoral gas use in UKTM scenarios failing to meet 2050 carbon targets.
Scenarios not meeting 2050 targets include abandon, insular, and aﬀordable. The left
hand axis has units in PJ, and the right hand axis in Bcm.
Fig. 5. Primary energy consumption in UKTM scenarios that meet the UK's 2050
carbon targets. Scenarios meeting 2050 targets include maintain and maintain (tech
fail). Natural gas is split into domestic production (Dom) and net imports (Imp).
Fig. 6. Sectoral gas use in UKTM scenarios that meet the UK's 2050 carbon targets.
Scenarios meeting 2050 targets include Maintain and Maintain (tech fail). The left hand
axis has units in PJ, and the right hand axis in Bcm.
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broadly similar to the reduction in Aﬀordable and at a greater level
than was seen in Insular. It is unsurprising that Maintain and Main-
tain (tech fail) are comparable in 2030 because the only diﬀerence
between them, carbon capture and storage, is assumed only to become
available in Maintain in 2025. Coal is eﬀectively eliminated in both
scenarios, but with a small fraction remaining in energy-intensive in-
dustries.
Turning to gas consumption, which is increasingly met by imports,
between 2010 and 2030 60% of the drop seen in both scenarios results
from falls in the electricity sector, with smaller drops in industry (ac-
counting for 15% of the total drop) and residential (20%). There is,
however, signiﬁcant construction of new CCGT capacity throughout the
2020s (7.5 GW in Maintain (tech fail) and 10 GW in Maintain), al-
though this is much less than the 22 GW installed in Aﬀordable. The
key function of this gas capacity, however, is to assist the integration of
variable renewables, as electricity generation from gas falls markedly
between 2010 and 2030. Around 200 PJ (55 TWh) of electricity from
coal plants is lost over this period but coal-to-eﬃciency and coal-to-
renewables is a more cost-eﬀective solution than coal-to-gas substitu-
tion. Since Aﬀordable, which fails to meet the long-term 80% reduc-
tion target, has a much greater level of coal-to-gas switching, this
highlights a potential risk of relying predominantly on coal-to-gas
switching in the power sector to meet the 2025 emissions reductions.
A small increase in the use of gas in transport can also be seen in
both Maintain scenarios in the medium term, reaching a maximum of
100 PJ in Maintain and 170 PJ in Maintain (tech fail). In both cases
there is some uptake of CNG in Light (LGV) and Heavy Goods Vehicles
(HGV). In both of these scenarios, this growth in CNG occurs while the
technology market for hydrogen matures and by 2050 in both sce-
narios, all HGV service demands are satisﬁed by hydrogen. Possible
alternatives for the road freight sector include biofuels and electric
vehicles. However, electriﬁcation of freight—at scale—is not an option
due to battery size and range issues. On biofuels, bioenergy tends to be
allocated for use in industrial and electricity sectors, particularly in
combination with CCS,2 leaving limited supply available for domestic
biofuel production.
Over the long-term to 2050, there are much starker diﬀerences both
between these two scenarios and with the scenarios described above.
Similar to what was seen in the ESME scenarios above, it is clear that
without CCS, gas is again almost entirely removed from the UK energy
system. What remains inMaintain (tech fail) is predominantly used in
industry (most of which is as a petrochemical feedstock or in non-en-
ergy uses) and as back up to the intermittency of renewables in the
power sector (installed gas capacity is used at less than 5% load factor).
Overall consumption is less than 450 PJ (12 Bcm), a 90% reduction on
2010 levels.
In Maintain, there is a signiﬁcant decrease in residential sector
consumption, as this sector increasingly electriﬁes with heat pump
technologies, and increases district heating coverage. However, this loss
is largely compensated for by the growth of an entirely new industry,
namely the steam methane reforming (SMR) of natural gas to produce
hydrogen. Crucially, this SMR is carried out in combination with CCS so
that the overall level of emissions that occurs is vastly reduced.
Hydrogen in this context provides a useful vector for decarbonising
decentralised service demands, predominantly transport (as discussed
above) and industry, in approximately equal proportions. This tech-
nology is entirely absent in all other scenarios examined, demonstrating
the necessity of both emission reduction goals, and the availability of
CCS if gas for hydrogen production is to have any role in the future UK
energy system.
There again continues to be some use of gas in the electricity sector,
both as back up to renewable intermittency and as centralised CCS
plant, although with only 2 GW of gas CCS capacity installed in the ﬁnal
period, this latter role is marginal. There is also continued reliance
(around 300 PJ or 8 Bcm) on gas in industry, although as above, the
majority of this is as use as a feedstock for petrochemicals and in non-
energy uses. The emergence of hydrogen in the industry sector in latter
periods impinges on the use of gas, as well the use of biomass, which is
more usefully deployed elsewhere.
Gas use in the residential and service sectors (Buildings in Fig. 6)
exhibits a rapid decline between 2030 and 2050 in this scenario. It is
only after 2035, as the 80% target becomes increasingly diﬃcult to
meet, that the majority of changes occur in the use of gas in buildings.
This delayed action in respect of buildings poses challenges for emis-
sions reduction policies. Continued use of gas is a very cost-eﬀective
way to provide heating in buildings, not least because all the necessary
infrastructure has already been deployed over the past number of
decades. Shifting to an alternative energy source, such as widespread
electriﬁcation, is likely to require huge investment in infrastructure
(such as the strengthening of the distribution system), improved system
balancing (to deal with a much larger peak demand), new technologies
across households, and the development of new markets. These alter-
natives are cost-eﬀective only at higher CO2 prices (i.e. when the re-
duction targets are increasingly stringent) and so only start to be
adopted at a signiﬁcant scale after 2035. Replacing nearly all of the gas
used in buildings with alternatives, including with district heating but
more signiﬁcantly heat pumps, within a 15-year period is in reality
extremely ambitious,3 and would require signiﬁcant development of
infrastructure and market capacity beforehand to achieve. In reality, it
is likely that the transition away from the consumption of gas in
buildings will need to be underway in the mid-2020s. Key strategic
decisions will need to be made concerning residential heating, as the
UK government, network operator, and utilities, in consultation with
consumers, work through the diﬀerent options, which also include
serious consideration of hydrogen supply to buildings, which would
allow for the existing gas pipeline infrastructure to be maintained (CCC,
2016).
3.2.3. Gas as a bridge
We can use the above UKTM results to address the question as to
whether or not gas can act as a bridging fuel towards a low-carbon UK
energy system (Fig. 7). Despite a small rise (< 3%) in Maintain be-
tween 2015 and 2020, and a very slightly higher level of consumption
(< 4%) in the 2020s in Maintain compared with Abandon, gas con-
sumption is lower in Maintain in all subsequent periods and falls
continuously from 2020.
Looking back to the requirements to classify gas as a bridge set out
earlier, it is apparent that gas acts as both a relative and absolute bridge
only over the period 2015–2020. Thereafter it soon falls below the level
of gas consumption in both Abandon and in 2010. However, given that
the absolute and relative increases in consumption between 2015 and
2020 are marginal, and since ESME did not exhibit any similar such
increases, we conclude that, on our deﬁnitions of the term, there is
practically no potential for gas to act as a bridge to a low-carbon
economy in the UK.
There is, nevertheless, some small potential for gas to act as a bridge
fuel in speciﬁc niche sectors. For example, in both Maintain and
Maintain (tech fail) there is some uptake of CNG in LGVs and HGVs.
This is also seen in Aﬀordable but not in either of the other two non-
80% reduction scenarios. At its peak, nearly 35% of HGVs are CNG-
fuelled in Maintain and nearly 60% in Maintain (tech fail). Since
consumption of gas in freight transport grows in both Maintain sce-
narios out to 2040, compared with both 2010 and Abandon, it could
2 The use of BECCS (bioenergy with CCS) provides negative emission or an emissions
credit for each unit of CO2 captured from bioenergy, due to the CO2 naturally stored in
bioenergy during its growth phase.
3 For comparison, the natural gas appliance replacement programme required for
moving from town gas to natural gas took around 11 years (1967-77).
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therefore be reasonable to argue that natural gas can act as a bridge in
the freight sector.
4. Discussion and conclusions
Both the ESME modelling and the UKTM Maintain and Maintain
(tech fail) scenarios make it clear that meeting the 2050 target will
constrain the role for natural gas in the UK's energy system in the 2020s
and beyond. The nature of that role is dependent on other develop-
ments in the wider energy system—such as new nuclear, the rate of
energy eﬃciency improvement, demand reduction and the scale of
renewable energy—and the availability of key technologies. ESME re-
sults make clear the signiﬁcance of CCS to keeping gas in the power
generation mix and certain sectors of industry. Without CCS gas must
be steadily phased out over the next 35 years and almost entirely re-
moved by 2050. This represents a major challenge in relation to the
decarbonisation of domestic heat and undermines the economic logic of
investing in new CCGT gas power generation capacity.
The Maintain and Maintain (tech fail) scenarios see a signiﬁcant
drop in the role of gas in the electricity sector (60%) and smaller drops
in industry and the residential sector in the 2020s. In the electricity
sector, the fall in coal generation is more cost-eﬀectively replaced by
increased end-use sector eﬃciency and growth of renewables rather
than through coal-to-gas swtiching. It is only in the 2030s and beyond
that the two scenarios diﬀer signiﬁcantly. The absence of CCS in
Maintain (tech fail)—in keeping with the ESME results—means that
gas must eventually be almost entirely removed from the energy
system. What remains is used by industry and sparingly as back-up to
renewable intermittency. The Maintain scenario keeps a signiﬁcant
amount of gas with CCS in the mix by ﬁnding a new role for it in the
production of hydrogen. Under the conditions described in this sce-
nario, a signiﬁcant amount of gas consumption (40–50 Bcm or 50% of
current levels) can still be compatible with the 2050 target.
Our analysis makes clear that determining the future role for gas in
the UK is not a straightforward matter. A simple decision to shut down
all coal-ﬁred power generation by 2025 and build a new ﬂeet of CCGT
gas-ﬁred power stations could be problematic as it could ‘lock in’ a
signiﬁcant amount of gas-ﬁred capacity that would only be able to
operate at very low load factors in the 2030s and beyond, unless ret-
roﬁtted with CCS. It is questionable whether or not investors could be
persuaded to build this capacity without very strong policy incentives,
if load factors were even lower than they are now. Incentivising them to
do so—for example via a capacity market—might not be the most cost-
eﬃcient solution. Those resources (the cost of which would ultimately
end up on consumer bills) might be better used by replacing that lost
coal capacity with additional energy eﬃciency and demand reduction
measures and/or additional renewable energy capacity. The analysis
also makes clear the centrality of CCS to retaining gas in the power
generation mix and certain sectors of industry. Without CCS, demand
falls dramatically in the 2030s and beyond, making it even harder to
justify investing in new gas-ﬁred power generation.
Two ﬁnal notes of caution. First, timing is everything: delays in
commissioning a new ﬂeet of nuclear power stations and/or a slow-
down in the deployment of renewable forms of energy—particularly in
a context of no coal-ﬁred generation after 2025—may increase the fu-
ture role of gas to levels that are not compatible with the existing UK
“Carbon Budgets”, particularly in the absence of CCS. What happens in
the 2020s is critical in determining the path of the UK's energy system
in the 2030s and beyond. It is important to avoid a high carbon ‘lock in’
that would either cause carbon targets to be missed, or leave signiﬁcant
amounts of infrastructure stranded due to a costly and rapid drive to a
lower carbon system in the 2040s. Second, our scenarios show that the
UK debate should not be reduced to a choice between a future with gas
and a future without it. Maintain demonstrates that a signiﬁcant
amount of natural gas can still be consumed beyond 2030—though
natural gas plays a diﬀerent role than it does today. The real challenge
is managing a ‘soft landing’ for the gas-ﬁred power generation sector
that keeps suﬃcient capacity on the mix as its role changes. In addition,
alternatives to the use of gas outside the power sector, particularly in
heating homes, need to be explored urgently. It is not clear that current
policies will achieve this, which highlights the lack of a clear vision of
the future role for gas in the UK's low carbon energy system.
The take-home message is clear. If all coal-ﬁred power generation is
to be removed by 2025, and the opportunity for CCS is delayed do-
mestically through lack of policy support or lack of global progress on
commercialisation, then policy makers must think very carefully about
how best to replace that capacity. A ‘second dash for gas’ may provide
some short term gains in reducing emissions. However, our modelling
suggests that this is not be the most cost-eﬀective way to reduce emis-
sions and, in the absence of CCS technologies, it may well compromise
the UK's decarbonisation ambitions. While these results will not ne-
cessarily be mirrored in all other countries (given diﬀering levels of coal
and gas consumption, prospects for economic development, access to
electricity and clean cooking facilities, and concerns over emissions of
local air pollutants) they are likely applicable in many other advanced
economies with mature gas markets (McGlade et al., 2014).
Finally, for other countries, gas may provide a stronger transition
role, particularly in those systems in which coal dominates, and where
solutions are being sought to reduce CO2 emissions and tackle air pol-
lution (McGlade et al., 2014). However, even in such countries, careful
consideration will need to be given to the longer term outlook for gas,
such as we have outlined here for the UK, since signiﬁcant gas infra-
structure investment is likely to be required to push coal eﬀectively out
of the energy mix, investment that could be left stranded if dec-
arbonisation deeper than that oﬀered by coal-to-gas switching is found
to be necessary.
In the context of the UNFCCC process, such issues are particularly
pertinent, as countries revisit and strengthen their Nationally
Determined Contributions, and start to develop their long term low
GHG emission development Strategies.4 The role of natural gas in the
future, and decisions concerning investment in new infrastructure will
need to be carefully considered to avoid lock-in, given the level of
ambition required under the Paris Agreement. International coopera-
tion on the development of CCS systems will be critical to reduce un-
certainty and allow for consideration of natural gas continuing to play a
signiﬁcant role in the energy system in the 2040s and 2050s.
Fig. 7. Gas consumption over time in Abandon, Maintain, and Maintain (tech fail). The
left hand axis has units in PJ, and the right hand axis in Bcm.
4 In accordance with Article 4, paragraph 19 of the Paris Agreement, http://unfccc.int/
focus/long-term_strategies/items/9971.php.
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Appendix A. Description of models
UKTM
The national UK TIMES energy system model (UKTM) has been developed at the UCL Energy Institute over the last two years as a successor to the
UK MARKAL model (Kannan et al., 2007). It is based on the model generator TIMES (The Integrated MARKAL-EFOM System), which is developed
and maintained by the Energy Technology Systems Analysis Programme (ETSAP) of the International Energy Agency (IEA) (Loulou and Labriet,
2007).
UK MARKAL was largely developed by UCL within UKERC, and was used as a major underpinning analytical framework for UK energy policy
making and legislation from 2003 to 2013 (CCC, 2008; DECC, 2011a; DTI, 2007; Ekins et al., 2011), and UKTM continues to perform this role as the
central long-term energy system pathway model used for policy analysis at the former Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and the
Committee on Climate Change (CCC). It has been used for DECC's analysis of the 5th Carbon Budget, which sets the limit on GHG emissions in the UK
for the period from 2028 to 2032 (DECC, 2016). With the aim to increase the transparency in energy systems modelling and to establish an active
user group – including key decision makers – an open source version of UKTM is being prepared that will be updated on a regular basis.
UKTM is a technology-oriented, dynamic, linear programming optimisation model representing the entire UK energy system (as one region) from
imports and domestic production of fuel resources, through fuel processing and supply, explicit representation of infrastructures, conversion to
secondary energy carriers (including electricity, heat and hydrogen), end use technologies and energy service demands. Like other models of this
type, as noted above, it minimises the total welfare costs (under perfect foresight) to meet the exogenously given sectoral energy demands under a
range of input assumptions and additional constraints and thereby delivers an economy-wide solution of cost-optimal energy market development.
The model is divided into three supply side sectors (resources & trade, processing & infrastructure and electricity generation) and ﬁve demand
sectors (residential, services, industry, transport and agriculture). All sectors are calibrated to the base year 2010, for which the existing stock of
energy technologies and their characteristics are taken into account. A large variety of future supply and demand technologies are represented by
techno-economic parameters such as the capacity factor, energy eﬃciency, lifetime, capital costs, O&M costs etc. Moreover, assumptions are laid
down concerning energy prices, resource availability and the potentials of renewable energy sources, etc. UKTM has a time resolution of 16 time-
slices (four seasons and four intra-day times-slices). In addition to all energy ﬂows, UKTM tracks CO2, CH4, N2O and HFC emissions. The model
structure is illustrated in Fig. A.1. For more information on UKTM, see (Daly et al., 2015; Fais et al., 2016; Pye et al., 2017, 2015a).
On gas resources, three supply steps are given for each of the four reserve types with diﬀerent cumulative potential and extraction costs, thus
establishing resource supply curves with 12 steps. The reserve types include i) located reserves, ii) reserves growth, iii) new discovery, and iv) shale
gas. Each resource step is associated with an activity in 2010 (calibrated to the DUKES energy balances, DECC, 2011b), a cost of activity, and the
cumulative reserves (total resource availability in PJ over the model horizon, based on McGlade and Ekins, 2014). The auxiliary gas use for
extraction is taken into account (based on the DUKES energy balances, assuming that 75% of auxiliary gas consumption is used for production and
25% for transmission network operation). In addition, GHG emissions from leakage and ﬂaring during fossil fuel extraction are modelled in UKTM
(based on data from the GHG Inventory (DECC, 2013)).
Fig. A.1. Schematic of features of UKTM. Adapted
from Remme et al. (2002).
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ESME
ESME (Energy Systems Modelling Environment), developed by the Energy Technologies Institute (ETI), is a fully integrated ESM, used to de-
termine the role of diﬀerent low carbon technologies required to achieve the UK's mitigation targets. The model has been used in this capacity by the
UK Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and the UK Committee on Climate Change (CCC) (CCC, 2011, 2013, DECC, 2011). Built in
the AIMMS environment, it uses linear programming to assess cost-optimal technology portfolios. The uncertainty around cost and performance of
diﬀerent technologies and resource prices is captured via a probabilistic approach, using Monte Carlo sampling techniques. The focus of uncertainty
is on technology investment costs in the power and transport sectors, fuel costs and resource potential e.g. biomass imports. The characterisation of
uncertainty, implemented in ESME v3.2 which was used in this paper, is described in detail in Pye et al. (2015b).
The representation of energy demand sectors is typical of other ESMs, with representation of power generation, industry, buildings and other
conversion sectors e.g. biofuel production, hydrogen production. The model endogenously determines how to meet these demands in a cost-optimal
manner, through investment in end use technologies (including eﬃciency measures), and the production and supply of diﬀerent energy forms. In the
household sector, a rich characterisation of low carbon technologies is provided, particularly for heat pumps, district heating (incl. infrastructure)
and building fabric retroﬁt. The transport sector also incorporates key low carbon technologies, and the diﬀerent infrastructure required to deliver
alternative fuels e.g. electricity charging infrastructure and hydrogen networks. The industry sector is characterised more simply, focusing on
eﬃciency gains, fuel switching measures and carbon capture and storage (CCS). Transformation sectors (power generation, hydrogen production,
biofuel production) represent the key low carbon technologies, and associated infrastructures (to enable inter-node transmission). Primary resource
supply is characterised by commodity price and resource availability, with no distinction between imports and domestic indigenous production
(except for biomass), and no explicit representation of resource and upstream sectors.
On GHG emissions accounting, ESME accounts for CO2 but not other greenhouse gases (GHGs). Therefore, the CO2 emissions constraints applied
in the model exogenously assume the level of non-CO2 GHG levels in future years, taking account of expected abatement, with necessary adjustments
made to the CO2 target. In this version of the model, a non-CO2 GHG level of 55 MtCO2-eq is assumed in 2050, based on CCC (2010) that allows for
105 MtCO2 in 2050. A more detailed description of the ESME model can be found in (Heaton, 2014), while an overview of the ESME data sources is
provided in ETI (2016).
See Table A.1.
Appendix B. Description of UKTM scenarios
The ﬁrst, called ‘Abandon’ assumes that climate change policy is downgraded in importance during the late 2010s. The Climate Change Act is
repealed in 2021, partly due to political opposition to the short-term costs of decarbonisation at a time of continued austerity, and partly due to a
failure by the international community to implement the ambitious deal agreed in Paris in 2015. This means that further limits on emissions beyond
the 3rd Carbon Budget (2018-22) are not implemented. The UK maintains its commitment to international trade and integration with international
energy markets. However, because of a relative lack of emphasis internationally on moving away from fossil fuels, and consequently higher overall
demand, the price of fossil fuels is relatively high in this scenario. Despite the repeal of the Climate Change Act, because of a desire to ‘sweat’ current
assets and to ensure a continued commitment to EU Directives, the existing pledge that no new unabated coal power plants are to be constructed
remains.
The second, Insular, scenario also assumes that climate change policy is downgraded in importance during the late 2010s. The Climate Change
Act is repealed in 2021, for similar reasons to Abandon, which again means that further limits on emissions beyond the 3rd Carbon Budget are not
Table A.1
UKTM sector descriptions.
Sector Description
Resources and trade Includes potentials and cost parameters for domestic resources and traded energy products. For fossil fuels, assumptions are mainly based on results
from the global energy system model TIAM-UCL (Anandarajah et al., 2011), while the assumptions on bioenegy potentials are aligned with the CCC's
Bioenergy Review and the Extended land use scenario (CCC, 2011).
Energy processing Covers all energy conversion processes apart from electricity generation, including oil reﬁneries, coal processing, gas networks, hydrogen production,
bioenergy processing as well as CCS infrastructure.
Power generation Represents a large variety of current and future electricity generation technologies as well as storage technologies, the transmission grid and
interconnectors to Continental Europe and Ireland. The technology assumptions are mostly aligned with DECC's Dynamic Dispatch Model (DDM)
(DECC, 2012).
Residential Domestic housing is divided into existing and new houses. In addition to a large portfolio of heating technologies for the two main energy service
demands of space heating and hot water, other services like lighting, cooking and diﬀerent electric appliances are represented. The technology data is
based on various UK-focused building studies, including (Bergman and Jardine, 2009), (Davies and Woods, 2009), (Radov et al., 2009), and (Element
Energy and Energy Saving Trust, 2013).
Services As per residential structure, but stock divided into low- and high-consumption non-domestic buildings. The technology data is based mostly on the
same UK-focused building studies mentioned for the residential sector.
Industry Divided into 8 subsectors of which the most energy-intensive ones (iron & steel, cement, paper and parts of the chemicals industry) are modelled in a
detailed process-oriented manner (Griﬃn et al., 2013), while the remaining ones are represented by generic processes delivering the diﬀerent energy
services demands. The demand projections are aligned with the DECC Energy and Emissions Projections model (EEP).a
Transport Nine distinct transport modes are included (cars, buses, 2-wheelers, light goods vehicles, heavy goods vehicles, passenger rail, freight rail, aviation
and shipping). For road transport, the demand projections are based on the road transport forecasts 2013 (DfT, 2013) and the technology parameters
are mainly sourced from (Ricardo-AEA, 2012).
Agricultural and land use Represents, in addition to processes for the comparatively small fuel consumption for energy services, land use and agricultural emissions as well as
several mitigation options for these emissions (Moran et al., 2008).
a This model is used to produce the UK energy and emission projections, the latest of which can be found at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/ﬁle/368021/Updated_energy_and_emissions_projections2014.pdf. The industry demand projections are not publically available but were provided by DECC on request.
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implemented. As a reaction to economic problems at home and the perceived failure of international markets and institutions, UK citizens vote to
leave the EU. It also shifts towards a more inward looking energy policy with, for example, much less electricity connection to the European
continent. Strict limits are placed on imports in favour of domestic fossil fuel (including new coal) and renewable resources, and prices of fossil fuels
are relatively high as a result.
The Aﬀordable scenario continues with commitment to climate change targets well into the 2020s, but with an impression that the world is not
acting suﬃciently quickly to reduce emissions, this commitment starts to falter. This results in a lack of agreement on the 5th Carbon Budget (2028-
32) because of the perceived high costs of meeting progressively challenging targets and so only the 4th Carbon Budget (2023-27) is met. The UK
shifts away from any ambition to take a leadership position on climate change, and progressively argues for the EU to play a following role in
international negotiations. Policies to support the deployment of renewables are progressively scaled back as is policy support for nuclear and CCS.
In the Maintain scenario, the UK continues its commitment to climate change targets (i.e. 80% GHG emissions reduction by 2050). The 5th
Carbon Budget is agreed, broadly in line with Committee on Climate Change advice. Part of the reason for this is a relatively strong climate
agreement in Paris and signiﬁcant progress by many countries towards meeting their commitments. This drives down the costs of many low carbon
technologies and energy eﬃciency measures and starts to remove trade barriers. This includes CCS technologies which are successfully commer-
cialised and ‘rolled out’ alongside other low carbon technologies. Since the world shifts away from carbon-intensive fuels, particularly coal, fossil fuel
prices remain relatively low.
The Maintain (tech fail) scenario is similar to Maintain, but there is a failure of eﬀorts to commercialise CCS technologies. More emphasis is
therefore placed on other forms of mitigation to meet UK targets such as renewables, nuclear power and energy eﬃciency.
Some of the key assumptions that vary across each of the above scenarios are set out in Table 2. The scenarios with 2050 emissions reduction
targets are also required to keep within a cumulative level of emissions between 2028 (the end of the 4th Carbon Budget period) and 2050. This
ensures that there is a steady progression towards the 2050 target and is used as a proxy for future Carbon Budgets to be set by the Committee on
Climate Change. The cumulative constraint is constructed on the basis of a linear decrease from the maximum emissions level in 2028 to the level
required in 2050. For example, Maintain has maximum emissions in 2028 of 430 Mt CO2-eq and 160 Mt CO2-eq in 2050. A linear decline between
these dates yields total emissions of 6750 Mt CO2-eq, which is therefore imposed as a cumulative limit on emissions between these dates in this
scenario.
The above scenarios can be visualised with respect to the ‘Energy Trilemma’ (World Energy Council, 2015) of the interplay and tensions between
the goals of emissions reduction (decarbonisation), ‘keeping the lights on’ (energy security), and the aﬀordability of energy for consumers (called
‘equity’ in the WEC version of the trilemma). It is noteworthy that the UK lost its AAA rating in the 2015 WEC benchmarking exercise because the
rising cost of electricity at the time reduced its ‘equity’ score to a B.
Fig. B.1 shows a diagram of the Energy Trilemma, positioning in which represents policy priorities within each scenario, rather than the assumed
result of any scenario.5 In Abandon, for example, the repeal of the Climate Change Act, a failure to support or allow the cheapest forms electricity
production, no eﬀorts to mitigate emissions globally and an assumption that energy prices will be high mean that the scenario would potentially fail
to fully achieve any of the trilemma objectives. Therefore, it is equidistant from all the corners of the diagram. Insular, Aﬀordable and Maintain
concentrate primarily (though not exclusively) on one of the main goals, and so are located towards the corners of the diagram. However, there is, for
example, a slightly greater emphasis on emissions mitigation in Aﬀordable than in Insular (since the former is required to fulﬁl the 4th Carbon
Budget while the latter is not), meaning that it is positioned slightly closer to the ‘decarbonisation’ corner. Maintain (tech fail) is placed slightly
along the ‘security’ axis but also further from the ‘aﬀordability’ corner than Maintain. Maintain (tech fail) excludes CCS, but still needs to meet
decarbonisation objectives. It is therefore likely that there will be more emphasis on domestic renewable and eﬃciency measures rather than
importing fossil fuels for use in centralised power plants.
Fig. B.1. The location of UKTM scenarios within the energy trilemma.
5 A comprehensive analysis of the implications of these scenarios for energy security and aﬀordability is beyond the scope of this report. A separate UKERC project is underway that is
analysing the security implications of these scenarios.
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